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Considerations of policy dictate that the person who owns land should have no claim
of ownership to a cave which lies so far beneath his land that he cannot reasonably
expect to reach and use it. By analogy to air law, his only right should be that the
laws be not so used as to interfere unreasonably with his enjoyment of the surface.
Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 41 F.(2d) 929 (D.C. Ohio 1930), mod. 55 F.(2d)
201 (C.C.A. 6th 1932); Rest., Torts § 194 (1934). He has that much right in respect to
the land of his neighbor. Walsh, Equity § 36 (193o). There is no sound policy in the
law which would deny the right to use property to the person who has the sole access
to it and give that right to one to whom the property is utterly useless. In contrast
to the large number of people who have access to a given airspace, as a practical matter
only one person has access to the cave. If the cave is to be of value to anyone, it must
be used through him. His industry and expense in utilizing the cave are sufficient
grounds for giving him ownership of it.
When, however, a cave is reasonably accessible to the surface owner the arguments
just advanced in favor of the owner of the mouth no longer apply to him. In such a
case, if the surface owner were to be deprived of the subterranean ownership he
would lose a distinct and physically accomplishable right-to excavate and enjoy the
subsoil profits-which is a well recognized right in the law of real property. iTiffany,
Real Property §§ 253 ff. (2d ed. 1920). An exercise of that right would put him in the
same position in relation to the cave as the owner of the mouth, thereby entitling him
to all the arguments advanced in that person's favor, together with the benefit of the
traditional common law rule. Mere failure to exercise the right should not divest it in
the absence of adverse possession. The recent tendency to allow airplane flights to invade the lower strata of the air may be prompted by policies in favor of air transportation that will not aid the owner of the mouth of a cave, which runs close to the surface
in establishing rights in it. See Hinranv. PacificAir Transport,84 F.(2d) 755 (C.C.A.
9th 1936), noted in 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 48o (I937).

Torts-Agency-Liability of Railroad to Sender for Loss of Registered Mail[Jllinois].-A bank, the plaintiff's insured, sent a package containing $21,ooo in currency by registered mail. After being carried part way in a mail car on the defendant's
railway under the direction of a government mail clerk, the package, together with
other mail, was put in a locked pouch and transferred to a baggage car on one of the
defendant's branch-line trains where it was handled by trainmen, none of whom had
taken the government oath prescribed by the postal laws. During some switching
operations, the baggage car was negligently left unguarded and the money stolen. The
plaintiff, having paid the bank, brought this action as assignee of the bank's claim.
From a judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of the loss, the defendant appealed. Held, three justices dissenting, reversed. The defendant is an agent of the
government in the exercise of a public function and is therefore not liable for torts of
its own agents. Aetna Ins. Co. v. I.C. Ry. Co., 365 Ill. 303, 6 N.E. (2d) 189 (1937).
Invoking the doctrine that public officials are not liable for the negligent acts of
their official subordinates seems ill-advised in the instant case. Although the doctrine
may have a historical basis in some tenuous notion of the identity of official and government which would entitle him to governmental immunity (see Lane v. Cotton, I Ld.
Raym. 646, 648 (1701)), it has been most commonly supported by the policy of making
public office attractive to responsible men. Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515 (i888);
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i Mechem, Agency § 1502 (2d ed. i9i4). This policy does not apply to railroads, however, because the carrying of mail is obligatory by statute. 39 Stat. 428 (1916); 39
U.S.C.A. § 539 (1928).
The doctrine finds its traditional application in cases of regular government officials
(Lane v. Cotton, i Ld. Raym. 646 (1701); Dunlop v. Monroe, 7 Cranch. (U.S.) 242
(1812); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507 (1888)), but the same result is dictated by
broader considerations in the law of agency. See Denton v. Y. & M. Ry. Co., 284 U.S.
305 (1932); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 57 F.(2d) ioo4 (C.C.A. 4th 1932). In a typical agency situation, an intermediate corporate official has not been held liable for the
negligence of his subordinates because the benefits of the subordinates' activity run
primarily to the corporation. Ellis v. So. Ry. Co., 72 S.C. 465, 52 S.E. 228 (io5);
Brown Lumber Co. v. Sessler, 128 Tenn. 665, 163 S.W. 812 (1914). Similarly in the case
of the regular public officer, the benefit runs to the government. See Dunlop v. Motroe, 7 Cranch. (U.S.) 242 (1812) (postmaster). And where a carrier transporting mail
has so been exempted as a public official, the result is again explainable on general
agency doctrine; here, the employees of the carrier having been sworn into government
service, the carrier lacked control and could not prevent negligence. Conwell v. Voorhees, 13 Ohio 523 (1884); Foster v. Melts & Co., 55 Miss. 77 (1877); Boston Ins. Co. v.
C.R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 118 Iowa 423, 92 N.W. 88 (1902); Banker's Mutuality Casualty
Co. v. M.St.P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co., 117 Fed. 434 (C.C.A. 8th 1902).
But the instant case is unable to derive support from these conventional agency notions. Since the employees of the railroad had not taken the government oath, the
railroad had complete control of their activity. Further, the railroad and not the government was the direct recipient of the benefits of the subordinates' acts. Thus in such
cases, vicarious liability has previously been imposed upon the railroad. Sawyer v.
Corse, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 230 (1867); Central R. & B. Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 357 (1885);
Skaggs v. M.K.T.R. Co., 228 Mo. App. 808, 73 S.W. (2d) 302 (1934). In reaching its result, moreover, the court ignored its earlier decision in Barker v. C.P. & St.L. Ry. Co.
(243 Ill. 482, 9 N.E. 1057 (igog)), relied upon by the appellate court and the dissenting justices, which held that a railroad carrying mail is an independent contractor
with the government and liable on respondeatsuperior.
The court further argued that entirely apart from considerations of agency it would
be unfair to impose liability on the railroad since it did not know the value of the
mail it was transporting and hence had no opportunity to take precautions commensurate with the risk assumed. If strict common carrier liability were here sought to be
imposed, this argument might have validity (3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 144 (1935)), but
this action is based on negligence. Since the conduct of the railroad was negligent, even
if the contents of the package were df so little value that a duty to use only slight care
was raised, and the injury were of a foreseeable type, the value of the package is irrelevant on the issue of liability. The traditional policy argument against imposition of
liability on agencies serving the public-that the cost to the public will be greatly increased-seems very weak in this instance, since it is only the exceptional case in
which mail is not under the direct control of a government mail clerk. Cases will be
further limited by the refusal of courts to impose liability for the loss of non-mailable
matter. United States v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 215 Fed. 56 (C.C.A. 4th 1914) (diamonds).
Nor finally does the court find much comfort in resurrecting the ghost of the doctrine of Winterbottom v. Wright (io M&W. 109 (1842)), that a tort action based on a
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duty created by contract is limited to parties privy to that contract. In these terms,
the sender would not be able to rely on the contract between the railroad and the
government, to which he is not a party, to raise a duty of care from the railroad to
him. To adhere to the privity doctrine and thus obscure the patent duty arising from
the possession in the railroad is one more example of the classic failure to recognize a
distinct duty arising apart from the contract. See Labatt, Negligence in Relation to
Privity in Contract, i6 L. Q. Rev. i68 (igoo); McPhersonv. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382, III
N.E. ioso (i916).
Trade Regulation-Anti-Trust Laws-Use of Patents and Copyrights in Restraint
of Trade-[Federal].-In a suit for copyright infringement the defendant answered
that the plaintiff had a virtual monopoly of popular music copyrights in violation of
the Sherman Act. The license fee demanded of the defendant had been twice that paid
by the defendant's competitor. The plaintiff moved to strike. Held, motion granted.
Buck v. Hilsgrove Country Club, Inc., i7 F. Supp. 643 (R.I. 1937).
Through cross-licensing agreements with other large manufacturers, the defendant
controlled indispensable patents on communication equipment. The plaintiff brought
a suit to enforce the issuance of a license to him alleging that the defendant's control
was a violation of the Sherman Act. Held, suit dismissed. Andrea v. Radio Corporalion of America, 14 F. Supp. 226 (1936), aff'd, 88 F. (2d) 474 (C.C.A. 3d 1937).
Courts have been slow to apply the principles of the anti-trust laws to combinations
involving patents or copyrights. The patent law gives patentees and copyright owners
the "exclusive right to make, use and vend .... ." (i6 Stat. 201 (1870); 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 40 (1929)) and it is clear that the anti-trust laws do not affect the right of the owner
of a single patent or copyright to license whomever he chooses at whatever rate he
pleases. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber W. Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C.C.A.
7th 1907). In some of the early cases under the Sherman Act courts were so impressed
by the "exclusive right" thus granted that they extended the individual patent
monopoly privilege to patent pools. Bement v. National Harrow Co., i86 U.S. 70
(1902); United States ConsolidatedSeeded Raisin Co. v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 126 Fed.
364 (C.C.A. 9 th 19o3); see Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. i (1912) (overruled in
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (I917)); contra,
NationalHarrowCo. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 36 (C.C.A. 3d 1897). While nothing in the patent
law expressly limits the manipulation of patents, succeeding cases have considerably
lessened the powers originally thought to have been granted to patentees and copyright holders. The right to control resale prices has been denied. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (i9o8); Straus v.Anmerican PublishersAss'n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913);
Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Straus, 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Boston Store v. American
Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918). The Court has invalidated so-called "tying contracts," whereby use of the patented product is granted only to those purchasing
other products from the patentee. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co.,
243 U.S. 502 (1917); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27
(ig3i); InternationalBusiness Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
The trade control in the principal cases, however, is less clearly affected by the Sherman
Act since it was exercised by the patentee directly upon the marketing of the patented
and copyrighted articles themselves. But there is some indication that application of
the Sherman Act will not be affected in any case by the fact that the combination at-

